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The Dominican Grassroots Movement and
the Organized Left, 1978-1986
EMELIO BETANCES*
ABSTRACT. Through their struggles for better services, grassroots
movements played a large role in the process of democratization
and construction of social citizenship in the Dominican Republic.
The modern grassroots movement, especially in relation to the
uprising of April 1984, challenged the government's neoliberal
policies and opened the way for the emergence of an indepen
dent movement that confronted both left-wing parties and orga
nized labor. However, because the gains from expanding social
citizenship remained limited in the face of the Dominican state's
inability to formulate socio-economic policies, the movements at
best posed a worthwhile goal that Dominican society may revisit
in the near future.

Introduction

G

RASSROOTS MOVEMENTS REMAIN PERTINENT to under
standing die course of Latin American history and the demo
cratic process. The revolutionaryforces of the 1970s and 1980s
thought that these movements could be used as conduits to promote
the construction of a socialist society. However, the grassroots move
ments themselves only sought ways to resolve their social issues within
capitalist confines. They were the organized expression of people
who live in low-income neighborhoods and who make their living in
both the formal and informal economy. They include proletarians,
*

I want to thank my colleagues Hobart Spalding, Barbara Heisler, Christopher Mitchell, and
Carlos Vilas, the anonymous reviewers of Science
Society for their comments, and Isabel
VaUela and Thomas Deveny for their help with the translation from Spanish.
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semi-proletarians, the unemployed, shopkeepers, peasants evicted
from their lands, people who make their living on a day-to-day basis,
etc. A clear conflict existed between grassroots movements and petty
bourgeois revolutionaries. In some cases, the movements joined to
challenge capitalism, and they succeeded in Cuba (1959) and Nica
ragua (1979); but elsewhere the story differed and the grassroots
suffered defeat ie.g., Brazil, 1964; Chile, 1973). The Latin American
grassroots had to struggle within the capitalist system to press their
demands for social citizenship rights. The Dominican movement mir
rors the larger reality of Latin America as it fought for basic social
rights.
This article analyzes the role played by grassroots movements in
the Dominican Republic. Focusing on the early stages of the 1980s
protest cycle, I argue that in their struggles for better services, grass
roots movements contributed to the process of democratization aftd
construction of social citizenship. Challenging the sta'te to recognize
social citizenship rights, these movements opened a new chapter in
Dominican social history. For their part, the managers of the state and
the elite faced serious limitations fulfilling the promises of democracy
because of deep-seated social inequalities.
Confronting these challenges, the grassroots movement waged a
long struggle to get recognized and, in the process, started to build
citizenship rights, demonstrating that social citizenship resulted from
struggles between those at the bottom and those at the top. Because the
IMF and the United States stripped the Dominican state of its power
to formulate socioeconomic policies, the grassroots ofily achieved
limited gains. The maximum achievement was to set a worthwhile
goal that Dominican society may revisit someday.

Theoretical Framework
Two sets of literature frame the analysis of the social movement
and the construction of social citizenship. The first focuses on how
social movements have challenged neoliberal economic policies and
promoted democratization (Caetano, etal, 2006; Stahler-Sholk, etal,
2008; Lopez Maya, 1999; Lopez Maya, et al., 2008; Boron and Lechini,
2006; Lopez Maya, et al, 2010; Webber and Carr, 2013). Despite the
strong links that the literature finds between social movements and
democratization, few have ventured to study social movements and
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the development of social citizenship (Dagnino, 2003; Holston, 2008;
Merklen, 2005). To overcome this limitation, this article draws on
citizenship studies to analyze the contested nature of social citizen
ship in Latin America. The works of T. H. Marshall (1964), Anthony
Giddens (1985),David Held (1989), Engin F. Isin and Bryan S.Turner
(2002), and Engin F. Isin (2008) provide the analytical framework.
Marshall suggests that citizenship is comprised of three compo
nents: civil, political, and social rights. He noticed considerable over
lap between the last two, recognized the inequalities and injustices
produced by capitalism and state institutions, but saw the develop
ment of citizenship as a process of extension of rights that eventu
ally strengthen society, increasing social solidarity and reducing class
conflict.
The civil right became, for the workers, an instrument of raising their social
and economic status, that is to say, for establishing the claim that they, as
citizens, were entitled to certain social rights. But the normal method of estab
lishing social rights is by the exercise of political power, for social rights imply
an absolute right to a certain standard of civilization which is conditional only
oh the discharge of the general duties of citizenship. (Marshall, 1964, 94.)

Social movements played a fundamental role in exercising influence
'on political power and gaining rights. Unlike Marshall, who focused on
workers' movements in England, this article concentrates on struggles
of grassroots movements for social rights such as education, healthcare,
housing, and public infrastructure that are at the center of the process
of construction of citizenship rights. Unlike worker struggles that oper
ate within the confines of a capitalist enterprise, the grassroots may
be outside the factory, but their informal economic operations also
take place within "the capitalist system. Like workers' movements they
make claims on the capitalist state and, as such, contribute to building
social citizenship. As Marshall noted, it takes a long time for groups
to develop legislation and to exert effective pressure on the state. In
order to understand the construction of social citizenship'in Latin
America, this article builds on Isin's suggestion to focus on processes
and relationships that underUne the formation and definition of social
groups. Concentrating on the social in citizenship means:
(1) These groups are socially constructed; (2) social processes of inclusion
and exclusion are at work for each type of right; (3) unequal social relations
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are centrally located; (4) we cannot start from the premise that equality
requires sameness; and (5) differentiated rights can ameliorate historical
inequalities and injustice. A focus on the social in citizenship challenges the
notion that citizenship comprises a static and universalistic legal status of ab
stract individuals in nadon-states. To interrogate what is social in cidzenship
means drawing attention to the process-oriented and contested character of
citizenship. (Isin, 2008,11.)

The making of social citizenship is the product of struggles waged
by labor and grassroots movements over a significant period of time;
social citizenship acquires the historic characteristics of a particular
social formation. At the same time, citizenship remains a source of
conflict, as the political regime formally recognizes certain social
rights, but the capitalist economic system denies them. Thus, (:itizens
must continuously challenge the ruling power to get their rights rec
ognized even after legislation has been passed.
The development of social citizenship in Europe and Latin Amer
ica contrasts sharply. In Europe, citizenship emerged in conditions of
strong endogenous economic development and diminishing social
inequality. Colonialism and imperialist domination enabled Europe
to extract resources from the peripheries and create markets for their
goods. These conditions allowed some European countries to begin
expanding social citizenship rights in the latter third of the 19th cen
tury, but most particularly following World War 11. The postwar expan
sion continued until the 1970s, when social citizenship rights began
to decUne, a reminder that the struggle for social rights is recurrent
and dependent on periodic capitalist crises.
In the European case democracy emerged as a political regime
that combined two components: a system of rules/actors/institutions
and a socioeconomic decision-making system. These two components
emerged in a historical context of the rise of industrial capitalism,
with a national culture that developed and facilitated identification
between representatives and represented.
In contrast, Latin America experienced the legacy of neocolonial
ism: deep economic inequalities. The system of rules/actors/institu
tions separated socio-economic decision-making from the political
regime because of economic dependence. In addition, ethnic and
regional differences and the retarded development of a cohesive
national culture in many countries deterred the full development

394

SCIENCE 6f SOCIETY

would contribute to the construction of social citizenship. In fact,
many of the Neighborhood Committees developed with the support
of the PRD made demands on behalf of the communities and stated
the need for establishing institutional mechanisms for resolving local
public issues.
The Neighborhood Committees recruited many people living in
the slums of cities to work on community-based projects. They pro
vided services such as "disposal of solid wastes, upkeep of recreational
parks, street signs, tree planting, organizing vigilance to maintain
order and combat delinquency, the construction of sports venues and
other community activities with the collaboration of the local govern
ment and neighborhood self-help groups" (Perez and Artiles, 1992,
139-140). Up to a point, these Neighborhood Committees contin
ued the work done by the cultural clubs, but now the Neighborhood
Committees carried out their activities in coordination with the local
government. In her study of grassroots organizations in the 1980s,
Tajira Vargas found that in the neighborhoods of Santo Domingo the
Neighborhood Committees constituted 33.50% of tiie total number
of community organizations, the cultural clubs 18.70%, and women's
groups 11.67% (Vargas, 1994,94). This data shows tiie important push
provided by the PRD in the organization of Neighborhood Commit
tees. However, this experiment did not prove successful at the ground
level of the poor neighborhoods surrounding the Capital and in the
provinces, because the Neighborhood Committees began to be seen as
mechanisms controlled by the state, which was attempting to limit the
development of independent communities. Moreover, in the middle
of an economic crisis, the state itself could not respond to the expec
tations created by the plan to establish Neighborhood Committees.
They soon beca'rhe government job search mechanisms and victims
of the political rivalries among the various tendencies that existed
within the PRD. This situation caused many Neighborhood Commit
tees to become independent and to search for their own solutions to
the concrete problems in their communities (Matias, 1991, 30). This
experience shows that in the 1980s the organization of autonomous
Neighborhood Committees contributed significantiy to the cohesion
of communities in the poor neighborhoods.^
1

Details and analysis of the neighborhood committees in the provinces are in my not-yetpublished manuscript, "En busca de la ciudadania: movimientos sociales y democratizacion
en la Repiibhca Dominicana."
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The second option for neighborhoods during the 1980s was a
revolutionary solution proposed by Left. The Partido Comunista del
Trabajo (PCT — Communist Workers' Party) proposed the creation
of the CLPs for the purpose of creating political conditions that would
lead to a revolutionary situation such as the one that had produced
the uprising of 1965. The CLPs thought the political situation in the
Dominican Republic resembled that of elsewhere in Central America,
where significant revolutionary processes unfolded (Franco, interview,
2010). The idea for the creation of the CLPs emerged in the midst
of a strike by the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Telefonicos
(SNTT — National Union of Telephone Workers) during 1982-1983.
This union had been in conflict with the Compahia Dominicana de
Telefonos (CODETEL — Dominican Telephone Company). Draw
ing the attention of the population led to a solidarity campaign. Left
militants created the CLPs to strengthen this solidarity and in defense
of the workers.
Even though left parties created CLPs, they included members
of the cultural clubs, people without any party affiliation. They also
included members of Neighborhood Committees and the Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs — Ecclesiastic Base Communities),
small church groups inspired by liberation theology.^ Pedro Franco,
one of the founders of the first CLPs, states that it was created in an
open assembly (Franco, interview, 2010). According to Franco, the
CLPs had their origins in a labor conflict. However, other social and
political actors continued the groundwork for such organizations to
emerge in the North Zone neighborhoods of the city. It is worth not
ing that the majority of the leaders were leftist militants who did not
reside in poor neighborhoods. Most were students from the Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo (UASD), the public university.
The CLP organizational structure was more elitist and differed froin
that of the grassroots organizations, which were more flexible. In addi
tion, they assigned slum-dwellers a secondary role in the struggles.
According to Fidel Santana, there was no massive participation in the
CLPs. "The people wouldjoin these organizations because of slogans.
These slogans were the point of contact between the activist militants
and the community. If the community needed a school, something
2

For a detailed analysisof the CEBs, see my book The Catholic Church and PowerPolitics in Latin
America: The Dominican Case in Comparative Perspective.
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that moved the people, we would begin creating propaganda based
on that demand" (Santana, interview, 2007).
Diverse groups of the left employed CLPs for organizing the poor
neighborhoods. Prior to its intervention in the slums, the left was frag
mented into multiple political groupings, all of which participated in
some way in the construction and development of the CLPs. This frag
mentation influenced the operations of CLPs negatively. Nonetheless,
all of the groups used the clubs and the Neighborhood Committees
to reach out to communities. Victor Geronimo tells of the time when
he became a member of the Club del Progreso, noticing that there
was a discrepancy between the theory and the practice of that club:
The club did not implement any action in favor of and identified with the
needs of the people of Cienaga. As a result, we proposed the foundation of
the Movimiento Cultural y Deportivo Club Marcelino Vega, with objectives
that matched the needs of the people who lived there. We thought that the
word "club" was a foreign term; we did not understand why it was called that.
We wanted a cultural movement that would seek progress and facilitate the
demands of the community. (Geronimo, interview, 2007.)

Evidendy, Geronimo's group brought a different ideology that
did not fit in with the organization of the members of the local club,
and that is why he saw the need to rename and restructure some of
the clubs so that they could respond to this new strategy.
The CLPs were a type of vanguard that operated in the name of
the residents, and militants risked their liyes in clashes with the Police
and the National Army. In truth, however, they were organizations
created for immediate needs, operated nationwide, but did not have
a community basje. "The lack of a community base explains why the
CLPs privileged general problems over the local and particular ones
of the communities" (Matias, 1991, 37). The CLPs had their sights
set primarily on a socialist revolution; however, their attention to the
demands of the people was their way of approaching the poor neigh
borhoods. This explains why
these organizations were not successful in creating a structure that would link
them either to the population or to its base. Their composition was never
broad, nor did it have permanent roots in a territorial or spatial sense. The
political parties that guided the CLPs established the goals and objectives of
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these organizations. This might explain why there was no coherence in their
actions or in their proposals. (Perez and Artiles, 1992,101.)

The objectives of most CLTs and the community did not match. In
the long term, they did not succeed in laying roots in the community
where they conducted their activities. Community residents wanted
to build social citizenship by demanding that the state resolve issues
related to social services such as school, health, water, construction
and repair of streets and roads, while the CLPs wanted to create the
conditions for a socialist revolution.
Nevertheless, the CLPs spread throughout the-country and, in
particular, in the Northeast region of Cibao. Despite their limitations,
the CLPs helped to awaken a degree of social and political awareness.
They did not foster formation of stable organizations that could pro
mote the development of social citizenship.

The'Uprising of April 1984
The uprising of 1984, a watershed in Dominican history, deserves
special attention in explaining the political and social consequences of
stripping the capacity of the state's socioeconomic decision-making sys
tem. Local managers of the state kept insisting that they were defend
ing democracy, but while doing it, they were physically eliminating
citizens. The violence unleashed by security forces against insurgents
was only comparable to the revolt of 1965, when two factions of the
armed forces clashed. The uprising also constituted a turning point in
the relationship between the popular sectors and the regime headed
by SalvadorJorge Blanco of the PRD (1982-1986). During his electoral
campaign,Jorge Blanco had promised to move from political opening
to prosperity and many citizens expected that he would deliver. The
uprising constituted a wake-up call for the state and the socioeconomic
elite regarding the living conditions of a population whose rights as
citizens, recognized by the Constitution of the Republic, were actually
not respected by a regime that only seemed interested in the imple
mentation of neoliberal policies.
Without the capacity to manage socioeconomic policy, govern
ment institutions remained empty-handed and forced to break the
promises made to the impoverished neighborhoods of Dominican
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cities. Citizens from the lower echelons of society learned a hard
lesson: They lacked any protection from the political system that
promised them civil, political and social rights. In the meantime,
the uprising gave birth to a thriving grassroots movement that began
to pressure the government, at least for that moment, to recognize
citizenship rights.
Salvador Jorge Blanco realized that if he accepted the conditions
that the IMF imposed in order to provide additional loans, social
stability would be in danger, because the poorest segments of society
would be the most seriously affected. In a letter datedjanuary 2,1984,
and addressed to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan,
the Dominican head of state wrote:
The International Monetary Fund insists on demandingviolent adjustments
to the exchange system, disproportionate tax increases, excessive restrictions
in budgetary financing, accelerated canceling of our external obligations,
and a set of objectives for 1984. These objectives will be impossible to achieve,
if one takes into account the drop in price in our exportable goods, espe
cially sugar, and the difficulty in obtaining outside resources, due ... to the
international economic slowdown. {Hoy, 1984.)

He reminded President Reagan that even the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) made its support programs
conditional on his government signing an agreement with the IMF,
and he complained that this attitude brought into question the friend
ship and open collaboration that his administration had with the
United States. President Reagan curtly responded:
While we sympathize with your desire to minimize the social and economic
hardships associated with the economic adjustment program, we believe
that a process of stabilization and adjustment is inevitable. If we delayed the
process the difficulties will get worse in the short run
Once an accord
has been reached, I can assure you there will be a rapid ouday of assistance
funds by the government of the United States. {Hoy, 1984.)

Reagan's response made it clear that the Dominican government
had-no choice but to negotiate with the IMF, and consequentiy,Jorge
Blanco later traveled to Washington to meet with its director,Jacques
DeLarosiere. Following his return to the Dominican Republic, the
President waited until the beginning of Holy Week to address the

DOMINICAN GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT

399

nation and explain the results of his trip. He thought that giving his
speech while the more well-to-do were vacationing at the nation's
beaches and rivers would diminish its impact. But the leader seemed
to forget that the residents of poor neighborhoods could not afford
to go on vacation. On the evening of Monday, April 17 he announced
that the agreement with the IMF would not imply a reduction in the
level of public expenditure, nor of the autonomous organs of the state.
Besides, there would be no transfer—for the moment—of petroleum
and its derivatives to the currency free market. Further negotiations
had obtained international financing for import of basic food stuffs,
which also would not enter the currency free market. Nevertheless,
the leader recognized that
these measures would significantly affect the budget of the Dominican fam
ily, and in a particular way, the basic family food basket of social groups with
limited incomes.... I have arranged that, through the price cohtrol'mechanisms for consumable goods that the Institute for the Stabilization of Prices
(INESPRE) distributes, the final retail price for five food products that make
up the national diet be maintained at the current level. (Jorge Blanco, 1984a.)

The transfer to the currency free market of all goods except
petroleum, its derivatives, and five basic food products meant that
the m^ority of the population would have to shoulder the increase
in prices. In a tour of supermarkets and small establishments in the
city of Santo Domingo by journalists from£^ National following the
President's^ speech, they reported unanimous opposition to these
measures, because the increases in prices were practically automatic
in those establishments that already had goods on their shelves when
the increases were announced. The Holy Week truce did not stop
incisive commentaries by the residents of poor neighborhoods, and
people from the middle classes who could not leave on vacation {El
Nacional, 1984a).
The impoverished felt most strongly the generalized rise in prices,
in both the capital and cities of the interior. These price increases
proved dverwhelming for slum dwellers residing in the north of Santo
Domingo and in the interior. Although unanimity existed regarding
the intolerable nature of these increases, during Holy Week people
only complained about it, and no collective protest erupted. This did
not occur until Monday, April 23 in the nortiiern part of the city, when
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youths gathered in assembly and decided to call for a 12-hour work
stoppage. They convened residents to protest against the measures
announced by Presidentjorge Blanco. Young people in over a dozen
other neighborhoods heeded this call.
Both those who called for the stoppage in Capotillo and the police
were surprised by what happened. The police quickly arrived in the
neighborhoods and began to arrest as many people as they could, or
simply fired on the demonstrators. On the first day of the protests,
six people lost their lives, 30 received gunshot wounds, and 300 were
arrested (vVzcona, Monegro and Peiia, 1984). Although the Police
Chief, Jose Felix Hermida Gonzalez, declared at midday that "every
thing was under control," Special Operations agents were deployed
in the neighborhoods. These forces had been trained by the MAAG
(Military Assistance Advisory Group from the United States) to handle
urban and rural counterinsurgency (CEDEE, 1984, 8-9).
News about events taking place in the capital's neighborhoods
spread throughout the country and protests erupted in different parts
of cities in the interior. Police detained demonstrators in several places
in the Cibao and in one locale demonstrators sacked and set fire to
an INESPRE grocery store. Protests also broke out in the northeast.
In the city of Santiago the multitude sacked and set fire to the local
headquarters of the PRD. Similar events took place in dozens of slums
and burning tires blocked roads. Interestingly, all the areas affected
by the uprising represented the most impoverished in that particular
locale. In the south, police reported destruction of various commer
cial establishments and the arrest of more than 40 people. Looting,
clashes with the police, and arrests occurred throughout the Qbao.
On the second day of disturbances, the national death toll reached
44, along with niore than 150.victims of gunshot wounds. The police
admitted to 35 deaths in two days of disturbances, indicating the
grave magnitude of these incidents {El Nacional, April 25,1984; Ultima
Hora, April 25, 1984). The authorities also acknowledged that they
had detained hundreds, but that many had nothing to do with the
outbreaks, being only spectators. They were subsequendy freed.
On April 25, the third day of disturbances, protests continued in
neighborhoods of the capital and various interior cities. The police
and Secret Service agents shot at least one man at close range without
any exchange of words. A woman who ran a street concession received
several gunshot wounds and later died. By the end of the uprising
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estimates varied on the number of casualties. Huchi Lora, a recognized
journalist, reported that according to the Dominican Commission
on Human Rights, 70 identifiable dead existed, along with 50 more
still not officially identified. Lora reported that 157 people had been
wounded and 4,358 arrested (CEDEE, 1984, 7-13, Gonzalez, 1984;
Peiia, 1984; Lora, 1984).
The magnitude of the uprising caused Presidentjorge Blanco to
address the nation on the night of April 25. Surrounded by the top
brass of the Armed Forces, a way of showing viewers that he had the
support of the military, the President convenientiy forgot the words he
used to address U. S. President Reagan when he clairned that a relative
monetary stability characterized the country and that "a sharp rise in
the inflation rate undoubtedly would provoke such strong social ten
sions that they would disrupt the peace and the democratic process."
He stated that the leftist political opposition and the Reformist Party
had fomented the violence and that the burning of PRD headquarters,
arson in the sugar fields to damage the economy, and obstruction of
highway, roads and bridges impeding traffic demonstrated this. The
President declared that
these incidents are among the most violent recorded in the democratic
period of the country since 1961. Alongside this, we must recognize the
intervention ofour Armed Forces and of the National Police. Faced with the
aggressions against citizens and against themselves, they defended public
and private property and restrained their reactions with reasonable pru
dence. .. . This speaker will not hesitate or vacillate at any time to continue
assuming all the responsibilities that the exercise of power imposes. Those
who hold the hope of twisting the course of our history deceive themselves.
(Jorge Blanco, 1984b.)

Jorge Blanco's speech was not well received by much of the population,
and this editorial in El Nuevo Diario seemed to reflect this sentiment:
It is necessary to condemn the anarchy that shook the capital and the im
portant major cities of the country.... They foolishly destroyed local public
vehicles and looted or burned private establishments, especially small and
mid-sized businesses. But the response on the part of the forces of public
order is absolutely unacceptable. Their intention was to kill citizens, many
of whom were innocent, shooting indiscriminately in order to kill, as was
demonstrated by the number of people who lost their lives, estimated to be
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around fifty, the m^ority of whom were shot in the head or thorax, with
some 200 sufifering gunshot wounds. {El Nuevo Diario, 1984.)

Press reports indicate that humble inhabitants not involved in the
uprising comprised a m^ority of fatalities. In fact, the fact that the only
member of the armed force shot was accidendy fired up by another
soldier shows irrefutably that the demonstrators were unarmed; that
no exchange of gunfire occurred, but rather a massacre of ordinary
people.

The Uprising, As Seen by Dominican Sociologists at the Time
The uprising expressed a general crisis in Dominican society, and
various sociologists have provided interpretations. Wilfredo Lozano
(1997, 262) proposed that the social explosions were "an expression
of the breakdown of populist hegemony over the urban masses." Laura
Faxas notes this idea and proposes that the uprising represented the
crisis of the national-popular myth that the PRD had created in the
country since 1962. When the democratic transition took place in
1978, and a leader of the PRD assumed the administration of the
state, the myth began to break down and definitively collapsed during
the uprising of April 1984. This happened because, while in power,
PRD administrations did not fulfill the promises made during the
repressive years of the Balaguer regime (Faxas, 2007,18). Faxas cor
rectly points to a profound crisis in the populism of the PRD. The
party continued to maintain its populist discourse, but its actions at
the head of the National Executive branch and its relationship with
the dominant socioeconomic elite changed forever. The popular
national project had come to an end because the PRD had opted for
becoming integrated into the mainstream of state and society. The
PRD leadership appeared to be unaware that a democracy stripped
of its socioeconomic decision-making system could not respond to
the needs of citizens.
For his part, Carlos Dore Cabral proposed that, contrary to
what was commonly thought at that time, the uprising did not occur
throughout the capital or in all the cities in the interior, but rather in
the most impoverished neighborhoods. In a study of the newspapers
El Nacional and Listin Diario, Dore Cabral looked for articles related to
the uprising between April and September of 1984 in Santo Domingo.
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He found t±iat "the 93 areas with population that the ONE (National
Office of Statistics) recognizes, 67, that is, 72% of the total, do not
appear in the newspapers that were studied, and only 26, that is, 28%
of the total, are found in articles from those six months." That indicates
that the protagonists of the "insurrection without arms" of April 1984
were residents of the marginalized neighborhoods which are located in the
surroundings of Santo Domingo. In the most important mass demonstra
tions that have taken place in the country following the revolution of April
1965, the petty bourgeoisie ... did not participate in their organization or
leadership. One should look for the explanation of this fact in the discon
nect that exists between these actions and the established political forces.
(Dore Cabral, 1985a, 19-26.)

This finding has great significance for understanding the grass
roots movement following the April uprising. It explains why the par
ties and political movements of the left, right, and center could not
see what followed. The members of these organizations did not live
in those neighborhoods, and consequentiy, tJiey failed to grasp how
profoundly the Government's economic measures would affect those
neighborhoods (Dore Cabral, 1985b, 13-15). Altiiough Dore Cabral's
reflections are limited to the capital, a study of eight newspapers by
this author leads to the conclusion that the same thing happened in
many of the cities of the interior.

What We Learn from the Uprising in Retrospect
The uprising of April 1984 did not contribute directly to the
construction of social citizenship, but it revealed the social conse
quences of the transference of the socioeconomic decision-making
system to the IME The revolt showed that the managers of the state
and the socioeconomic elite faced serious limitations in attempting
to fulfill the promises of a democratic society while implementing
IMF-style economic policies. They also confronted national structural
constraints posed by widespread social inequality and the authoritar
ian political culture that permeates all political constituencies. The
rebellion exposed the inability of established political parties to bring
about social change. The PRD strategy of bringing cohesion to society
through the development of Neighborhood Committees that linked
local governments to communities did network, because of shifting
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political strategy and scarce resources. As with other mainstream politi
cal parties, the PRD applied a clientelistic system to recruit activists
into the party rather than strengthening local institutions and social
citizenship. In addition, labor leaders, who had functioned as the
vanguard of the grassroots movement, were surprised by the uprising.
They tried to lead it by calling for a nationwide strike against the IMFinspired policies, but nobody listened to the call. This demonstrated
that labor leaders no longer had much influence in the neighborhoods
when the uprising occurred. Militants of the left had been working
in Santo Domingo's slums, but they had not been able to consolidate
their presence and were overtaken by the events. As for the grassroots
organizations, they were fragile and unable to build alliances with
groups or individuals situated in high places.
By revealing existing high levels of misery and poverty, the upris
ing contributed to raising the consciousness of some sectors of the
petty bourgeoisie regarding citizens' rights. In particular, it caused
many young, petty bourgeois professionals to become involved with
social struggles. A good number of these young people began to work
in neighborhood organizations such as the Committee for the Defense
of Neighborhood Rights (COPADEBA), and Alternative City, an NGO
that emerged to technically support the social work of COPADEBA
in the neighborhoods in the north zone of Santo Domingo. Others
joined, as we shall see below: the Council of Popular Unity (CUP),
the Committees for Popular Struggle (CLPs), and parties on the left.
The emergence of the CUP and the CLPs illuminate how the
uprising contributed to raising the level of consciousness among the
politically active members of society. These organizations were able to
develop a strongprotest movement, which culminated with a nation
wide strike in February 1985. The strike's success sparked the develop
ment of a grassroots movement independent of parties on the right,
the center-left or the state. Interestingly, this new movement also
remained independent of labor, which until then had spearheaded
the grassroots movement.

The Council of Popular Unity, the CLPs,
and the Grassroots Movement
The CUP emerged as one of the strongest neighborhood orga
nizations after April 1984. It arose out of debates that took place on
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the left regarding what route they should take in order to achieve .a
socialist revolution. The great dilemma for the CUP was- whether it
should follow the lead of the "Revolutionary Left," which believed that
the revolution was "imminent," or whether it should integrate with
the work of the organization of the neighborhood residents. At that
time, the left promoted a penetration of cultural and sports clubs in
the neighborhoods in order to incorporate them into its strategy of
socialist revolution. On the other hand, the announced goal of the
CUP was to develop an autonomous grassroots movement in which
activists from all political parties could participate. The first CUP core
groups were created on May 19 in the east zone, and on June 3 in the
north zone of Santo Domingo. Later on, core groups emerged in the
south region and in Cibao, particularly in the northeast. Given that
the CUP's core groups wanted to be pluralist and attract people of
different political affiliations, from the beginning, they denounced
the slogan of "imminent revolution" and proposed to head the protest
movement then developing throughout the country. Following the
tradition of cultural and sports clubs, and even of the Ecclesiastic Base
Communities, the leaders of the CUP proved genuinely interested in
incorporating young people from marginalized neighborhoods into
the cultural organizations. They wanted to instill environmental values
in them, and above all, get them involved in the movement against
urban removal projects that were beginning to occur in the north
and east zones at the end of the 1980s. In spite of these efforts, only
in September 1984 did the CUP begin to be known as an emerging
organization that united diverse CLPs in the impoverished slums of
Santo Domingo. By February 1985, the CUP maintained that it united
60 popular organizations, and based on this representativeness, it
presented itself as one of the organizations with greatest presence
in Santo Domingo (Jimenez, 1985; Alvarez, interview, 2007; Franco,
interview, 2010).

The Strike of February 1985
The CUP, the Dominican Leftist Front along with more than
30 CLPs and popular organizations of diverse political-ideological
orientation, developed a strategy of staggered work stoppages that
culminated in the declaration of a national strike on February 11,1985.
Among the demands of these stoppages was a call for the government
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to break with the IMF, revoke the price increases, establish a mini
mum salary of 350 pesos per month and eight pesos per day in the
rural zones, a readjustment of 25% for those making 600, 30% for
those making 800 and 10% for those making 1000. In addition, they
demanded agricultural reform, the nationalization of foreign enter
prises, cessation of political repression, and that INESPRE should
supply the small- and medium-sized retailers (Ultima Hora, 1985). The
staggered work stoppages began in early September, in both Santo
Domingo and the interior. The fact that no violence occurred during
the stoppages shows that the new strategy of the CLPs worked. They
demanded the government respect civil, political, and social rights
of citizens, which are enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic.
They proclaimed the strike peaceful and rejected violence.
In early April the press reported several stoppages in the slums
of Santo Domingo and cities of the interior (Taveras, 1985; Azcona,
1985a; 1985b). Even though the government deployed a large num
ber of National Police patrols during the two weeks of the stoppages,
only sporadic confrontations occurred with demonstrators. This was
in- stark contrast with the government stance during the uprising of
April 1S84. Nevertheless, the police harassed the neighborhood lead
ers (especially those known to have ties with the left).
The government did everything possible to shut down the strike
on February 11, and when that failed, attempted- to limit its scope at
the national level. The President even took the lead by offering to
lower prices on basic goods a couple of days before the strike, to see
if that would halt its impetus. However, the strike organizers were not
impressed and reiterated their demands, despite lack of support from
labor unions (Bujosa Mieses, 1985).
A variety of "newspaper reports indicates that the general strike
was a total success for its organizers. Significantiy the strike proved
peaceful in nature and incidents between the strikers and the police
remained limited to a few neighborhoods in the city. In the principal
cities of Cibao, in the north, the entire population embraced it. The
same thing occurred in the east (Mora; Bujosa Mieses, 1985). Even
Don Rafael Herrera, editor of the conservative Listin Diario, recog
nized the strike's success. In his judgment, "the strike was a success
for its organizers. We sincerely deplore it. The strike was peaceful. We
sincerely celebrate it" (cited in Lora, 1985). This recognition meant
that the state and dominant socioeconomic elites had to take notice;
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a social movement was developing not under the control of the domi
nant parties, and this could have dangerous implications for social
stability. The state was losing control of the demonstrations, much
to their chagrin, and'consequently, they needed to take measures so
that these movements would return to the fold.
TheJorge Blanco administration understood that it had to act in
order to calm the situation of social and political tension. The Presi
dent decreed concrete measures to ensure that the processing plant
of INESPRE would produce low-priced milk. It readjusted electric bills
and emitted a decree exempting sardines, codfish, and herring from
import taxes (Lopez Reyes, 1985; Olivo, 1985). These announcements
revealed the success of the strike.
The staggered work stoppages and the general strike of February
11 showed that the grassroots organizations could act without being
managed from union headquarters. A new type of social movement
was beginning to form that demanded autonomy with regard to the
traditional political parties. The CUP and the CLPs appeared as the
new subjects of change, and exhibited their capacity to conduct a
strike without violence. The peaceful strike resulted in fewer demon
strators being detained, despite substantial law enforcement patrols
and random arrests. On this occasion, the protests coincided with
the desires of the slum dwellers, who did not want violence in their
neighborhoods, and pardy because of that, the work stoppages had
greater support in the urban slums and in rural communities. This
led the CUP and the CLPs to want to continue with the strategy of
staggered work stoppages at the local and national levels in order to
obtain certain concessions.
Social tensions continued throughout 1985 and work stoppages
occurred in different neighborhoods of the capital and the prov
inces. During the course of the year, the CUP and the CLPs grew
significandy, and had high visibility in the press. Their leaders, Pedro
Franco and Jose Pichardo, had become well-known figures,- because
they frequently called press conferences and publicized schedules of
CUP activities, where they maintained their critiques of government
policies. Through its actions, the CUP established the basis for initiat
ing the formation of an autonomous grassroots movement that would
fight toward the construction of social citizenship. By means of stag
gered work stoppages, they raised the consciousness of neighborhood
residents regarding the possibility of getting the authorities to respond
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to some of their needs by means of protests, marches, and confronta
tions with law enforcement groups. Nevertheless, these organizations
still needed to have a greater presence in the slums. The CUP had
this in mind, but the majority on the left remained interested in the
socialist revolution and not in constructing local institutions like the
Neighborhood Committees that were organically tied to the city halls.
The construction of strong organizations in the slums proved to be
the left's great challenge in the mid-1980s and beyond.
The protest cycle of the 1980s continued until 1992, when a series
of international and national events forced a precipitous decline of
social movement activities. On the international scale, the Gulf War
in the Middle East (August 1990) forced an increase in oil prices and
social movement actors could not blame the government for it. The
IMF successfully "persuaded" the government to deepen neoliberal
economic reforms, which led to privatization of most state-owned
assets, leading to layoffs, and weakening labor. While the government
succeeded in implementing neoliberalism and creating macroeconomic stability, the grassroots movement suffered political fragmenta
tion and lost steam. In the meantime, Non-Govemmental Organiza
tions (NGOs) emerged as a new social sector in the 1990s with full
support from private and government foundations in Europe and
the United States. This, of course, further offset the type of activi
ties grassroots organization had in the slums. Contrary to grassroots
organizations, NGOs provided, on a limited scale, needed services in
rural and urban communities and preached subordinated integration
into society rather than contentious actions.
The actions of NGOs coincided with neoliberal globalization,
which was producing a cultural shift whereby individualism, consum
erism, and a desire to get rich quickly using illicit means replaced
solidarity. Petty bourgeois intellectuals and leftist militants who used
to support the grassroots and labor movements took positions in
government, the private sector or migrated abroad. The decline of
the grassroots movement put claims for social citizenship rights on
the back burner, while government, NGOs, and mainstream politi
cal parties used clientelistic mechanisms to coopt those with social
move.ment experience.
In closing, it is worth noting that since 2009 new petty bour
geois movements, unconnected to the grassroots, have emerged.
The environmental and the 4% movement for education stand out.
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The environmental movement began in March 2009 when peasants
from the community of Gonzalo, in Monte Plata, near the capital,
protested that the government had issued a permit to Grupo Estrella,
an important local firm, to construct a cement plant three kilometers
away from Los Haitises National Park. The issue caused a national
uproar. President Leonel Fernandez (2008-2012) had to ask the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to conduct a fea
sibility study. This study confirmed the accusations and the permit
had to be withdrawn. Similarly, environmentalist protests forced
President Danilo Medina (who took office in 2012) to ask the UNDP
for another feasibility study concerning a permit to Xtrata NickelGlencore to exploit gold in Loma Miranda. Again, the UNDP study
confirmed local allegations about environmental damage and the
government had to withdraw the mining permit. However, it warned
that if an adequate technology to exploit the mine becomes avail
able, the government should re-visit the issue. In the meantime, the
environmentalists enlisted the support of the Catholic Church and
got Congress to pass a law in August 2014 declaring Loma Miranda
a National Park. However, in September President Medina vetoed
the law, arguing that it was unconstitutional and violated a series of
international conventions. Pressure from the business community
that supports foreign investments combined with political in-fighting
between Medina and Leonel Fernandez might explain the veto.
Medina wants re-election and this conflicts with Fernandez's inter
est to run in the 2016 presidential elections. In the meantime, the
environmental movement has suffered a setback.
The 4% Movement for Education emerged after four years of
denunciations and protests about implementing the General Law of
Education of 1997, which mandated 4% of the Gross National Prod
uct (GNP) for pre-university education. After four years of intense
mobilizations and protests, the 4% movement succeeded in getting
President Medina to implement the General Law of Education. Since
2012, Medina has ordered the initiation of a nationwide school con
struction program. He has also ordered the establishment of public
school programs from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. to replace the old system that
held classes in the morning and afternoon with different groups of
students. It is too early to evaluate this initiative, but Medina has
embarked on an unprecedented program to improve school facilities,
hire new teachers, and provide free lunches to students.
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These two petty bourgeois movements have revived social move
ments and the process of construction of citizenship rights. Unlike
the grassroots, which always presented multiple demands associated
with social citizenship, these movements are single-issue oriented and,
so far, have not ventured onto other concerns. This experience shows
that the strategy of building alliances with groups in high places and
using the media and symbols to carry their message has worked. As
such, they have brought back the issue of social citizenship to national
attention.

Conclusion
This article builds on the sociological literature that credits social
movements for their contribution to the construction of social citizen
ship. Going beyond citizenship theories, it seeks to understand the
linkages between social movements and the construction of social
•citizenship. The findings here reveal the inability of the state and
selites io' iniplement neoliberal economic policies and simultaneously
to advance, the social democratic process. Likewise, they show the
inability of the political parties to serve as vehicle of social change.
The strategy of the PRD to develop Neighborhood Committees and
sports clubs to bring cohesion to society and develop social citizenship
failed because, of its shifting strategy and scarce resources. Similarly,
the political parties of the left failed to coordinate their efforts with
those of the residents of the neighborhoods and were caught oflfguard
during the uprising of 1984.
Despite great struggles of resistance in the 1980s, the gains of the
Dominican grassroots movement were limited. Perhaps, the mavimiim
achievement was to pose a worthwhile goal that may be revisited by
Dominican society in the near future. A lesson to be learned is that
labor, grassroots, and petty bourgeois movements will have to establish
stronger organizations to wage their demands for citizenship rights
and unite around basic demands. This is just the beginning of the
story; building social citizenship takes a long time; it is a process of
advances and setbacks. The gradual decline of labor and grassroots
movements since the 1990s has impacted social citizenship negatively.
Nevertheless, new petty bourgeois movements emerged after 2009,
and they have adopted some of the demands of the grassroots and
labor movements. However, it remains to be seen whether the scattered
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and uncoordinated local protests of the grassroots movement will
absorb this lesson and develop into a full-fledged moverrient that can
deepen social citizenship.
10 South Steeple Chase
Gettysburg, PA 17325
ebetance@gettysburg.edu
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